Search and the Single Dormitory Room by Michigan Law Review
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 77 Issue 6 
1979 
Search and the Single Dormitory Room 
Michigan Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Education Law Commons, Fourth Amendment Commons, and the Housing Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michigan Law Review, Search and the Single Dormitory Room, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1540 (1979). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol77/iss6/5 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
NOTE 
Search and the Single Dormitory Room 
For over 1.8 million young Americans, "home" is a dormitory 
room. 1 Although lacking the opulence usually associated with 
'the American Dream, the dormitory room offers its scholarly 
tenant one of the family home's most precious comforts: privacy. 
This Note2 suggests that dormitory privacy should not be illusory. 
It argues that when a college3 breaches the standards of the fourth 
amendment in searching a student's room, the exclusionary rule~ 
1. U.S. BUREAU oF THE CENsus, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CENSUS Pua. No. 245, 
POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS 20 (1973). 
2. In addition to traditional research sources, this,Note relies on correspondence with 
a number of colleges and universities. Inquiries were originally sent to the largest state 
university in each state, requesting information on disciplinary procedures and search 
regulations. Twenty-seven universities answered these inquiries. A number gave addi-
tional help; the Housing Office at. the University of Michigan supplied a great deal of 
information, and officials at the University of Alabama, the University of Arkansas, the 
University of Florida, the University of Georgia, the University of Illinois at Urbunu-
Champaign, Indiana University, and the University of Minnesota provided detailed infor-
mation in follow-up correspondence. 
3. The word "college," as used in this Note, means a state-run institution of higher 
education. The term is used interchangeably with "university." Cases involving high-
school students will occasionally be used for analogy, but courts generally give less fourth 
amendment protection to high-school students. See, e.g., M. v. Board of Educ., 529 F. 
Supp. 288 (S.D. Ill. 1977), where a court held that high-school administrators need have 
only "reasonable cause to believe" that a law or regulation is being violated to justify the 
"limited intrusion" of asking a· student to empty his pockets. 429 F. Supp. at 292. Never-
theless, in Picha v. Wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214 (N.D. Ill. 1976), the court required high-
school administrators to have probable cause when searching in cooperation with the 
police. See generally Comment, The Fourth Amendment and High School Students, 6 
WILLAMETrE L.J. 567 (1970). 
4. The exclusionary rule finds its roots in the fourth amendment: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
The fourth amendment exclusionary rule was announced in Weeks v. United Stutes, 
232 U.S. 383 (1914). In that case, a defendant had been convicted of using the mails for 
transporting lottery tickets. Evidence obtained in a search that violated the fourth amend-
ment's warrant requirements had been admitted at trial. 232 U.S. at 386. The Court ruled 
that the fourth amendment required the exclusion of such evidence, though this holding 
was limited to actions in federal courts and to evidence seized by federal officials. 232 U.S. 
at 391-92, 398. 
The general application of the fourth amendment to the states was considered in Wolf 
v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). Acco7ding to the Court, the "security of one's privacy 
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should proscribe reliance on the fruits of that search to punish the 
student. 
The argument progresses in two steps. Section I observes 
that the guarantees of the fourth amendment apply to searches 
of college students' rooms by college officials just as they apply 
to searches of any private dwelling by government officials.5 It 
against arbitrary intrusion by the police - which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment 
- is basic to a free society. It is therefore implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and 
as such enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause." 338 U.S. at 27-
28. Thus, the amendment applies to the states through the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment. The Wolf Court, however, refused to apply the exclusionary rule 
to the states. 338 U.S. at 33. That refusal was overruled in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
(1961), in which the Court held the exclusionary rule to be one of the substantive rights 
of due process guaranteed to all persons by the fourteenth amendment. The Court held 
that the rule was of "constitutional origin," 367 U.S. at 649, and that it was "an essential 
part of the right to privacy." 367 U.S. at 656. 
5. Before a student may invoke the safeguards of'the fourth amendment, he must 
show that the college's conduct constitutes state action. Courts have uniformly held that 
the conduct of state university officials constitutes state action. See Powe v. Miles, 407 
F.2d 73, 82-83 (2d Cir. 1968); Wright v. Texas S. Univ., 392 F.2d 728, 729 (5th Cir. 1968); 
Dixon v. Alabama St. Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 158-59 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 
930 (1961); Morale v. Grigel, 422 F. Supp. 988, 996 (D.N.H. 1976), Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 
F. Supp. 777, 784 (W.D. Mich. 1975). Private-university students seeking vindication of 
their constitutional rights, however, have generally been unsuccessful in establishing state 
action. See Browns v. Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969); Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 
(2d Cir. 1968); Melanson v. Rantoul, 421 F. Supp. 49? (D.R.1.1976), aifd. sub. nom. Lamb 
v. Rantoul, 561 F.2d 409 (1st Cir. 1977); Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. 
Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School, 41 Ill. App. 3d 804,354 
N.E.2d 320, revd. and remanded, 69 Ill. 2d 320, 371 N.E.2d 634 (1977); Miller v. Long 
Island Univ., 85 Misc. 2d 393, 380 N.Y.S.2d 917 (Sup. Ct. 1976). State financial aid to 
the private college and other minimal forms of state involvement have usually not been 
found to be state action. See Melanson v. Rantoul, 421 F. Supp. 492 (D.R.I. 1976); affd. 
sub nom. Lamb v. Rantoul, 561 F.2d 409 (1st Cir. 1977). Students \lave also failed to 
convince the courts that private-university conduct becomes state action because the 
university has unde11aken a public function - education. See Melanson v. Rantoul, 421 
F. Supp. 492 (D.R.I. 1976); affd. sub nom. Lamb v. Rantoul, 561 F.2d 409 (1st Cir. 1977); 
Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). But see Ryan 
v. Hofstra Univ., 67 Misc. 2d 651,324 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Sup. Ct.1971), supplemented by 68 
Misc. 2d 890, 328 N.Y.S.2d 339 (Sup. Ct. 1972). Some students have cleared the state 
action hurdle by arguing that a "symbiotic relationship" exists between the private uni-
versity and the state, see Rackin v. University of Pa., 386 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Pa. 1974); 
Issaacs v. Board of Trustees, 385 F. Supp. 473 (E.D. Pa. 1974); King v. Conservatorio de 
Musica, 378 F. Supp. 746 (D.P.R. 1974). 
Although it may seem unfair that the privacy interests of students at state schools 
receive constitutional protection and those of students at private universities do not, the 
injustice stems from the limits of the Constitution's powers, see Civil Rights Cases, 109 
U.S. 3 (1883), and not from any explicit preference for state-college students. Students of 
private schools need not be totally defenseless, however; Congress could prevent private · 
violations of civil rights through its commerce power. Katzenbach v. McClung, 279 U.S. 
294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
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traces the happy demise of Moore v. Student Affairs Committee, 11 
which allowed students only limited fourth amendment rights, 
and the elevation of students' privacy rights to substantial equal-
ity with those of other adult citizens. Section II then contends 
that those rights require application of the exclusionary rule to 
bar illegally seized evidence from all college disciplinary proceed-
ings that might punish the student severely. Two conflicting dis-
trict court decisions, Morale v. Grigel1 and Smyth v. Lubbers, Hare 
compared by the light of three recent Supreme Court decisions 
construing the scope of the exclusionary rule. 0 The Note con-
cludes with a few simple recommendations for adapting the Con-
stitution's strictures to universities' administrative regulations. 
Such regulations would let all members of the university family, 
even those without legal training, know the limits and the signifi-
cance of dormitory privacy. 
I. STUDENTS ENJOY FULL FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
The law of student fourth amendment rights has been slow 
to develop. Because most students apparently prefer informal 
settlement to formal vindication of their rights, few disciplinary 
problems ever reach an official hearing. 10 Moreover, although 
most universities allow students to engage counsel for formal 
hearings, very few students do so. 11 As a result, courts have only 
recently been asked to scrutinize the broad powers of search and 
6. 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968). 
7. 422 F. Supp. 988 (D.N.H. 1976). 
8. 398 F. Supp. 777 (W.D. Mich. 1975). 
9. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); 
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). 
10. A sample of state universities reported the following percentages of cases settled 
prior to a formal hearing: 
University 
University of Alabama 
University of Florida 
University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign 
Indiana University 
University of Minnesota 









11. Universities reported the following frequencies of legal representation for students 
they discipline: 
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seizure that colleges have traditionally exercised over dormitory 
residents. 
A. Student Rights at Low Ebb - The Moore Doctrine 
The first important case on searches of college students' 
rooms, Moore v. Student Affairs Committee, 12 was not decided 
until 1968. Two state narcotics agents and the Dean of Men at 
Troy State University in Alabama searched six dormitory rooms 
without a warrant, 13 following a tip from "unnamed but reliable" 
informers. The local police chief suggested the search, but the 
dean approved it and it was performed in accord with university 
regulations. 14 The investigators found marijuana in Moore's 
University 
University of Alabama 
University of Arkansas 
University of Florida 
University of Georgia 
University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign 
Indiana University 
(See letters on file with the Michigan Law Review.) 










"less than" 1% 
13. One of the more disturbing aspects of Moore is its failure to examine why a 
warrant was not issued. Although the opinion is not clear, the plaintiff's counsel may never 
have raised the issue. It is also possible that officials had little time to obtain a warrant; 
there was some haste in conducting the search because the students were to leave that 
afternoon for a term break, 284 F. Supp. at 728. But see Comment, The Dormitory 
Student's Fourth Amendment Right to Privacy: Fact or Fiction, 9 SANTA CLARA LAW. 143, 
150 n.53 (1969). Even where there is probable cause, search without a warrant is per se 
unreasonable absent exigent circumstances, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 
(1967). The Supreme Court has been very reluctant to exempt any broad classes of 
searches from the warrant requirement, 389 U.S. at 357, and there appears to be no 
convincing reason to create an exception for campus searches. The university's interests 
in making the search are no more compelling than those of any traditional law-
enforcement agency, and the Court has not been receptive to claims that obtaining a 
warrant is overly burdensome for agencies unconnected with law enforcement. See Mar-
shall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978), where the Court rejected the Secretary of 
Labor's contention that obtaining a warrant for inspections under the Occupational 
Health and Safety Act would be too burdensome. 
14. 284 F. Supp. at 728. The regulation was printed in the college and university 
bulletins, in the student handbook, and in a leaflet of residence hall policies that was 
made available to all students. It read: 
The college reserves the right to enter rooms for inspection purposes. If the adminis-
tration deems it necessary the room may be searched an!l the occupant required to 
open his personal baggage and any other personal material which is sealed. 
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room, and after a hearing where Moore objected to the contra-
band's use as evidence, he was suspended indefinitely. Moore 
then sued for readmission, claiming that the university's search 
regulation was facially unreasonable and that its application had 
violated his fourth amendment rights. 15 
The opinion, written by Judge Frank Johnson, 16 first dis-
cussed whether the university's regulation was unconstitutional 
on its face. It held that university regulations on disciplinary 
searches were to be presumed reasonable if they were "necessary" 
to promote discipline and maintain an "educational atmosphere" 
at the institution.17 According to the court, these basic university 
responsibilities rendered a regulation facially valid even if it ex-
plicitly gave students less protection from the intrusions of col-
lege officials than the fourth amendment gives a criminal suspect 
from the intrusions of the police.18 That conclusion is peculiar, for 
in Mapp v. Ohio, 19 the Supreme Court had found the individual 
citizen's privacy interests weightier in the fourth amendment bal-
ance than society's law enforcement interests. Disturbingly, the 
Moore opinion failed to consider these two competing interests 
specifically. 
To better fill the societal interest side of the balance, the 
court might have argued that the university - unlike municipal 
. law enforcers - has two distinct interests: an interest in a disci-
plined "educational atmosphere" and an interest in law enforce-
ment on its campus. These interests might be considered cumula-
tively, their combined significance outweighing the law enforce-
ment interests presented by society in Mapp. Whatever the valid-
ity of such a "cumulation-of-interests" argument,20 the Moore 
court did not rely on it. Instead, the court found that the extraor-
dinary power to search without probable cause reposed comforta-
bly in the university's duty to maintain a disciplined 
15. 284 F. Supp. at 730. 
16. See generally R. KENNEDY, JR., JUDGE FRANK M. JOHNSON, JR.: A B1OGRAPHY 
(1978). 
17. 284 F. Supp. at 729. 
18. 284 F. Supp. at 728-30. "The student is subject only to reasonable rules and 
regulations, but his rights must yield to the extent that they would interfere with the 
institution's fundamental duty to operate the school as an educational institution."284 
F. Supp. at 730 (emphasis original). 
19. 367 U.S. 643, 659-60 (1961). 
20. The "cumulation-of-interests" argument seems to lack force in view of some 
universities' renunciation of any attempts to promote an amorphous "educational atmos-
phere." See note 69 infra; An End to Expulsions?, NEWSWEEK, March 28, 1977, at 72. 
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"educational atmosphere."21 Yet that conclusion does not square 
with the balance struck in Mapp. Is it more necessary for a uni-
versity to regulate hotplates, water balloons, and noisy stereos, 
than it is for society to protect itself from criminal activity? In-
deed, is it more necessary for a university to protect itself from 
criminal activity than it is for society in general? Even if the 
court's conclusion were tenable, it would not be relevant unless 
the Troy State regulation was, on its face, necessary to promote 
an "educational atmosphere." The opinion, however, gives no 
analysis to support that dubious factual determination. 
Even more troubling was the Moore court's neglect of the 
other pan in the fourth amendment balance: the court did not 
study the regulation's infringement upon students' privacy. The 
regulation did not limit searches to those based upon probable 
cause, or even to those based upon "reasonable cause" - a more 
lenient standard for dormitory room searches, which the court 
appeared to endorse l~ter in the opinion.22 Instead, the regulation 
broadly sanctioned searches of student rooms whenever "the 
administration deem[ed] it necessary."23 It contemplated no 
"disinterested determination"24 of the necessity of the search. 
The Moore court summarily dismissed consideration of the stu-
dent's privacy interest" with the cavalier observation that a stu-
dent was not "a tenant in any sense of the word."25 
After holding the regulation reasonable on its face, the court 
considered whether the regulation had been reasonably applied 
21. One possible explanation for the Moore court's cursory treatment of the regula-
tion's validity may have been a reluctance to question the educational judgment of the 
university. As a general rule, courts prefer not to interfere with educational and disciplin-
ary decisions of state educational facilities, with the result that a general presumption in 
favor of the validity of disciplinary regulations prevails. See Board of Curators v. Horo-
witz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978); Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 
1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970). 
The Moore court may not have scrutinized the need for the regulation because, in 
view of widespread student unrest at the time, it seemed obvious. See Why a Revolt on 
College Campuses, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 29, 1967, at 71. During the late sixties 
and early seventies, some universities believed extraordinary measures were necessary to 
maintain discipline and an educational atmosphere. Se.e Tough Line on Protests, 
SATURDAY REV., Dec. 16, 1967, at 69; Crackdown on Protestors, TIME, Nov. 10, 1967, at 
54. On the other hand, by no means all contemporary educators felt that the situation 
was sufficiently critical to necessitate arbitrary searches of dormitory rooms. See Wright, 
The Constitution on Campus, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1027, 1079 (1969). 
22. See text at notes 26-28 infra. 
23. See note 14 supra. 
24. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). 
25. 284 F. Supp. at 730 (quoting Englehart v. Serena, 318 Mo. 263, 273, 300 S.W. 268, 
271 (1927)). 
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in searching Moore's room. Emphasizing the special nature of the 
"student-college relationship, "26 the court held that the standard 
of justification necessary to search a dormitory room was lower 
than the "criminal standard" of probable cause. A university 
could search a dormitory room when there was "reasonable cause 
to believe" that the room was being used for an illegal punpose, 
or a purpose that otherwise seriously interfered with campus dis-
cipline. 27 The court gave three reasons for this lower standard: (1) 
the university has a duty to maintain discipline, (2) the student 
has only a limited property interest, and (3) the student, upon 
admission to college, waives objection to searches motivated by 
"reasonable cause. "28 
To support its first reason - the university's responsibility 
to maintain discipline - the court relied on cases dealing with 
searches of military quarters29 and of a high-school locker.30 Leav-
ing aside the question of whether high-school students or military 
personnel should be entitled to full fourth amendment rights, the 
court's analogies seem inappropriate. Military personnel must be 
strictly disciplined to follow orders that often contradict their 
inclinations. On the other hand, inaependence of thought is the 
lifeblood of a university;31 institutions of higher learning owe their 
greatness to an atmosphere that encourages a healthy skepticism 
of prevailing views. The high school's duty to maintain discipline 
is also distinguishable. High schools stand in loco parentis to 
their students, adopting a more stringent supervisory role than 
would, suit a college setting.32 In addition, because of the relative 
26. 284 F. Supp. at 730. 
27. 284 F. Supp. at 730. 
28. 284 F. Supp. at 729-31. One confusing aspect of Moore is that, in the early portion 
of the opinion, the court stated that these last two grounds should not be controlling, 284 
F. Supp. at 729. Yet, later in the opinion, the court disregarded its own admonition and 
relied on both the limited nature of the student's property interest and a waiver rationale 
in upholding the regulation, 284 F. Supp. at 731. 
29. E.g., United States v. Grisby, 335 F.2d 652 (4th Cir. 1964). 
30. See People v. Overton, 20 N.Y.2d 360, 229 N.E.2d 596, 283 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967), 
vacated and remanded per curiam, 393 U.S. 85 (1968); People v. Overton, 24 N.Y.2d 522, 
249 N.E.2d 366, 301 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1969). See also People v. Scott D., 34 N.Y.2d 483,315 
N.E.2d 466, 358 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1974). Another New York decision distinguished Overton 
from a college dormitory search on the basis of the students' ages. People v. Cohen, 57 
Misc. 2d 366, 292 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Dist. Ct. 1968). 
31. On the necessity for independence of thought in the modem university, see gener-
ally Freedom of Expression at Yale, 62 AM. A.U. PROFESSORS BULL. 28 (1976); Taylor, 
Politics and the Neutrality of the University, 59 AM. A.U. PROFESSORS BULL. 389 (1973). 
32. See, e.g., Morale v. Grigel, 422 F. Supp. 988, 997 (D.N.H. 1976); Buttny v. 
Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280, 286 (D. Colo. 1968) ("We agree with the students that the 
doctrine of 'In Loco Parentis' is no longer tenable in a university community , , • ,"); 
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immaturity of the students, high schools need far greater disci-
plinary powers to maintain order in the classroom, a task not 
easily solved by resort to criminal or juvenile laws.33 The proper 
disciplinary standard for the regimented environment of military 
barracks or high-school corridors hardly seems transferable to 
the "atmosphere of speculation, experiment, and creation"34 
that colleges must foster. Indeed, some universities have seriously 
questioned whether it is appropriate for a college to assume any 
disciplinary or law-enforcement role at all.35 
Goldberg v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 876, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463, 
470 (1967). 
Still, in Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978), the court used language 
which might indicate that the in loco parentis doctrine has not yet completely died: "The 
educational process is not by nature adversarial; instead it centers around a continuing 
relationship between faculty and students 'one in which the teacher must occupy many 
roles - educator, advisor, friend, and, at times, parent-substitute.'" 435 U.S. at 90 
(quoting from dissenting opinion of Justice Powell in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 594 
(1975)). 
In the years following the Moore decision, most colleges rescinded disciplinary regula-
tions influenced by in loco parentis considerations: 
To those who remember the days' when cutting too many classes was cause for 
suspension and smuggling a girl into a male dormitory could mean expulsion, 
today's college discipline seems extraordinary lax. In just ten years, most of the 
rules that once governed student life in loco parentis have simply disappeared. 
An End to Expulsion?, supra note 20, at 72. 
33. See generally SUBCOMM. To !NvEsTIGATE JUVENll.E DELINQUENCY, SENATE COMM. ON 
THE JUDICIARY, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS., FINAL REPORT ON THE NATURE AND PREVENTION OF 
SCHOOL VIOLENCE ANo VANDALISM (Comm. Print 1977). 
34. The phrase belongs, not surprisingly, to a former educator: Justice Frankfurter. 
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (concurring opinion). 
35. The University of Michigan, for example, does not impose any standards on its 
students in dormitories aside from those imposed by applicable landlord-tenant law. 
Sanctions are imposed either by damage assessments or, in severe cases, by evictions that 
are processed through the state courts. Interview with David Foulke, Director of Security, 
Housing Division, the University of Michigan, at Ann Arbor, Michigan (Sept. 24, 1977). 
Cornell University, as a result of disruptive incidents that occurred on campus in 
1966-1967, appointed a Commission on the Interdependence of University Regulations and 
Local, State and Federal Law. Addressing the issue of whether the University should 
involve itself in law enforcement, the Commission found that the University should take 
a more limited role, especially in those cases where the student was already being charged 
by law enforcement officials. 
Adherence to the principle of responsible student freedom and maturity re-
quires . . . that the University explicitly disentangle itself from acting as a substi-
tute mechanism for the law when students are charged with law violation by public 
officials. 
In the past, an informal working relationship between Ithaca and Cornell has 
permitted public officials to return students apprehended for less serious law viola-
tions to the University's jurisdiction, on the expectation that the University will 
impose through its disciplinary procedures a substitute punishment for court-
imposed penalties .... 
• • . The practice represents, in our judgment, an undesirable application of 
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As a second justification for the reasonable cause standard, 
the Moore court asserted that students' special property interest 
in their dormitory rooms embraces a lesser privacy interest than 
that of an ordinary lodger or tenant.36 The court's real-property 
analysis, however, is difficult to reconcile with Katz v. United 
States, 37 where the Supreme Court abandoned the "protected 
areas" analysis of fourth amendment protection: 
[T]he effort to decide whether or not a given "area," viewed in 
the abstract, is "constitutionally protected" deflects attention 
from the problem presented by this case. For the Fourth Amend-
ment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes 
to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of 
Fourth Amendment protection. . . . But what he seeks to preserve 
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be consti-
tutionally protected. 38 • 
Katz held that the technical classification of one's property inter-
est does not determine the scope of one's privacy interest. While 
the college may issue rental contracts specifying that students do 
not possess the legal equivalent of a tenancy, that specification 
does not alter a student's intention to preserve privacy in the 
room. It is an unusual student who would give the general public 
unlimited visitation rights. Furthermore, to whatever extent the 
protected-area analysis may have continuing vitl:!,lity, 39 students' 
rooms are their only home area - where they sleep and store their 
most personal effects - and the home area is the core value that 
the in loco parentis tradition . . • • 
A second consideration of equal importance is that Cornell's educational pur-
poses make inappropriate any extensive and continuous University assumption of 
varied law enforcement roles in its relations with students . . . . Wherever possible, 
the University should eschew acting as a general law enforcer or as a de facto "arm" 
or "agent" of public agencies. 
University Commission on the Interdependence of University Regulations and Local, 
State and Federal Law, Cornell University, Report (Oct. 2, 1967), reprinted in The Cornell 
Daily Sun, Oct. 4, 1967, at 8, col. 2. 
36. 284 F. Supp. at 729-31. On this point, the court relied on Englehart v. Serena, 
318 Mo. 263, 300 S.W. 268 (1927). In Englehart, the Missouri court stated: 
[The student] was not, however, a tenant in any sense of the word. He did not 
have even the full and unrestricted rights of a lodger, because Albert Hall was not 
an ordinacy lodging house. It was an auxiliacy of the college, and was maintained 
and conducted in furtherance of that institution's general purposes. 
318 Mo. at 273, 300 S.W. at 271. 
37. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, the Court ruled that the fourth amendment prohib-
ited the electronic surveillance of a telephone booth without prior judicial approval, 
granted upon a showing of probable cause. 
38. 389 U.S. at 351-52 (footnotes omitted). 
39. And there are indications that such analysis is alive and well. See Rakas v. 
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
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the fourth amendment seeks to protect. 40 The privacy of a stu-
dent's home area deserves undiluted protection. 
The final ground on which the Moore court based the reason-
able cause standard was a suggestion that students waive objec-
tion to such searches by living in the dormitory. 41 The reference 
to "waiver" was unfortunate, in light of the Supreme Court's 
holding five years later in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte42 that 
waiver analysis is inappropriate in fourth amendment cases.43 
The Schneckloth Court held that one may relinquish fourth 
amendment rights by voluntary consent, 44 even if one does not 
know of the right to refuse consent and thus does not make a 
knowing and intelligent waiver.45 But whether the Moore court 
meant to find waiver or only consent, its conclusion is cryptic: the 
40. Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test, 76 MICH. L. 
REv. 154, 175-77 (1977) ("The home is an obvious starting point in the search for the 
minimum content of the fourth amendment, for the wording of the amendment makes 
clear the great emphasis it places upon the right of the people to be secure in-their 
houses"). 
See also Athens v. Wolf, 38 Ohio St. 2d 237, 313 N.E.2d 405 (1974), where the court 
elaborated upon the student's reasonable expectation of privacy: 
Although few people who have ever resided in a college dormitory would favora-
bly compare those living quarters to the comfort of a private home, a dormitory 
room is "home" to large numbers of students who attend universities in this state. 
Because of the very nature of dormitory life, privacy is a commodity hard to come 
by, however much desired. . .. 
. • . Appellant is entitled to more than a modicum of privacy in his dormitory 
room. As regards intrusions by law enforcement officials, we hold that appellant is 
entitled to Fourth Amendment protection. · 
38 Ohio St. 2d at 240, 313 N.E.2d at 407-08. 
In Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 217 Pa. Super. Ct. 432, 272 A.2d 271 (1970), the 
court pointed out that "[a] dormitory room is analogous to an apartment or a hotel 
room." 217 Pa. Super. Ct. at 435, 272 A.2d at 273. 
41. 284 F. Supp. at 730-31. 
42. 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
43. 412 U.S. at 241, 247. "Nothing, either in the purposes behind requiring a 
'knowing' and 'intelligent' waiver of trial rights, or in the practical application of such a 
requirement suggests that it ought to be extended to the constitutional guarantee against 
unreasonable searches and seizures." 412 U.S. at 241. 
44. 412 U.S. at 248-49. 
45. 412 U.S. at 248-49. The Court restricted the knowing and intelligent waiver stan-
dard to cases involving relinguishment of constitutional rights necessary to preserve a fair 
trial, 412 U.S. at 237. Despite the fact that the Moore court appeared to rely on waiver 
analysis, it is probably just as well that Schneckloth mooted that analysis. The facts in 
Moore did not amount to a knowing and intelligent waiver anyway. Moore had signed no 
contract with a waiver included. Although the search regulation was printed in publica-
tions available to the student, 284 F. Supp. at 728, there was no evidence that the student 
had in fact read the regulation. Furthermore, the regulation did not explain that entry 
was permitted under a standard of cause less rigorous than that ordinarily applicable 
under the fourth amendment. 
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record included a stipulation that there was no consent.4n While 
the Schneckloth Court envisioned consent without waiver, one 
can hardly believe that it envisioned waiver without consent. And 
even if the facts of Moore did amount to a voluntary consent,n 
that consent would fail as an unconstitutional condition, for the 
state cannot condition the granting of a privilege - residence in 
a dormitory - on the forfeiture of a constitutional right. 4x 
B. The Demise of the Moore Doctrine 
Although heavily criticized over the years,49 Moore persisted 
as the principal decision on the legitimacy of dormitory searches 
and seizures50 until two recent district court cases invalidated 
46. 284 F. Supp. at 728. 
47. Nothing in the opinion suggests any manifestation of voluntary consent by Moore. 
284 F. Supp. at 728. 
48. See Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), where 
the court held that the student did not waive procedural due process rights by attending 
a university with regulations denying such rights. The court noted that "it nonetheless 
remains true that the State cannot condition the granting of even a privilege upon renun• 
ciation of the constitutional right to procedural due process." 294 F .2d at 156. In Common• 
wealth v. McCloskey, 217 Pa. Super. Ct. 432, 272 A.2d 271 (1970), the court found that a 
clause in the dormitory lease authorizing the university to check for damages, wear, and 
unauthorized appliances did not diminish the student's reasonable expectation of privacy, 
or operate as a consent to a police search. This aspect of the case is discussed in Note, 
supra note 40, at 159. 
See also Collier v. Miller, 414 F. Supp. 1357, 1366 (S.D. Tex. 1976), where the court 
ruled that the University of Houston could not condition admission to its stadium or 
pavilion on submission to a search. The Collier court relied principally on United States 
v. Chicago, M., St. P., & P. R.R. 282 U.S. 311, 328-29 (1931). 
49. See Comment, Public Universities and Due Process of Law: Students' Protection 
Against Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 17 KAN. L. REv. 512, 517-18, 520-22 (1969); 
Bible, The College Dormitory Student and the Fourth Amendment - A Sham or a 
Safeguard, 4 U. S.F. L. REv. 49 (1969); Comment, supra note 13, at 148-51. 
50. A few years after the Moore court held that a simple showing of reasonable cause 
was sufficient to justify searching student rooms, that holding was limited to situations 
where university officials participated in the search and the evidence was to be used only 
in internal college proceedings. Piazzola v. Watkins, 316 F. Supp. 624 (M.D. Ala. 1970), 
affd., 442 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1971). The case, decided by the same court that decided 
Moore, involved the same search of student rooms at Troy State University. Another of 
the students whose room was searched had been convicted of possession of marijuana and 
was suing in federal court for habeas corpus relief. The court, however, took a different 
view of the facts. In Moore, the court had concluded that the informers, though unnamed, 
were reliable, and that there was probable cause for the search, 284 F. Supp. at 728, 730 
n.11. In Piazzola, the court ruled that there was not probable cause. Moreover, the Moore 
opinion emphasized the role of the university officials in the search, while the Piazza/a 
opinion spoke of the university officials as if they were observers. Piazzola made clear that 
the Moore doctrine did not apply where the search was conducted by police officers, or 
where the evidence was to be used in a criminal proceeding. The court also ruled that the 
university's right to search could not be delegated to the police. 
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similar searches of student dormitory rooms. The two cases, 
Smyth v. Lubbers, 51 and Morale v. Grigel, 52 recognized student 
fourth amendment rights substantially equivalent to those of 
other adult citizens. 
In Smyth, housing officials at Grand Valley State College 
and local deputy sheriffs conducted a warrantless search of the 
plaintiffs' dormitory rooms. They acted pursuant to a regulation, 
probably influenced by Moore, that sanctioned such searches 
whenever college officials had "reasonable cause to believe" that 
federal law, state law, or college regulations were being violated. 
The search uncovered a small quantity of marijuana, and conse-
quently the college suspended two of the students, one for two 
years, and one for a term. 53 The court ordered the college to cancel 
the suspensions, holding the college's regulation invalid on its 
face because it permitted searches without warrants and without 
probable cause.54 The court rejected any waiver theory, whether 
based on the residence hall contract55 or on the plaintiffs' accept-
ance of the regulations as a condition for admission.56 In effect, it 
held that students in dormitories are entitled to the same fourth 
amendment protection that ordinary citizens enjoy in their 
homes.57 
In determining that the fourth amendment standard of rea-
sonableness required the university to have probable cause to 
search, the court used the balancing analysis that the Moore 
court had shunned, weighing the college's need to search against 
the violation of the student's privacy.58 It noted that, "for all 
practical purposes," dormitory rooms are students' homes, and 
therefore that students have the same expectation of privacy 
there as other citizens have in their homes. 59 Furthermore, the 
Later courts using Moore have not always recognized the restrictive effect of the 
Piazzola decision. See M. v. Board of Educ., 429 F. Supp. 288 (S.D. Ill. 1977); United 
States v. Coles, 302 F. Supp. 99 (D. Me. 1969). 
51. 398 F. Supp. 777 (W.D. Mich. 1975). 
52. 422 F. Supp. 988 (D.N.H. 1976). 
53. 398 F. Supp. at 782-83. 
54. 398 F. Supp. at 791. 
55. The contract that the plaintiffs had signed contained a clause whereby they 
agreed to abide by college regulations. 398 F. Supp. at 782. 
56. 398 F. Supp. at 788. 
57. 398 F. Supp. at 789. 
58. 398 F. Supp. at 785. 
59. 398 F. Supp. at 785-86. In determining the extent of the student's privacy interest, 
the court inquired as to what was the student's "reasonable expectation of freedom from 
governmental intrusion," relying on the reasonable expectation test posed by Justice 
Harlan in his concurring opinion in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). 
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court observed, protection of the home is the primary objective 
of the fourth amendment. 60 The court held that the college's in-
terest in order and discipline could not justify so extraordinary an 
enforcement tool as searches with less than probable cause. Since 
a college's interests in order and security are no greater than the 
government's interest in a peaceful community, the college must 
abide by the same fourth amendment standards. 81 
In holding the warrant requirement applicable, the court dis-
missed arguments by the college that such a requirement was 
inconvenient and would force tliem to turn their evidence over to 
the police.62 In the court's view, the college could readily obtain 
a search warrant under the applicable state statute without in-
volving the police. 63 The court also hinted that an internal search 
warrant - one issued by a college judicial body - might be 
sufficient, though it expressed some doubt as to whether a college 
disciplinary body was competent to decide "fundamental and 
sensitive" fourth amendment questions. 84 
Morale v. Grigel, 65 decided shortly after Smyth, also spurned 
the Moore doctrine. Officials of the New Hampshire Technical 
fustitute, which had no regulation governing searches, searched 
the plaintiff's room four times in a two-day period for a stolen 
stereo and some stolen marijuana. 68 The warrantless search un-
covered a pipe and some marijuana seeds, and after disciplinary 
proceedings, Morale was suspended. 
Like the Smyth court, the Morale court balanced the need 
to search against the invasion of privacy that the search en-
tailed.87 Citing Smyth, it concluded that a student is entitled to 
the same privacy in his room that any citizen has in his home.0H 
The court also ruled that the Institute did not have any· greater 
powers of search than ordinary law enforcement officers unless it 
could demonstrate that such powers were vital to some 
educational interest. The court could discern no such interest: 
Defendants have not convinced this court that [the college] has 
a clearly distinguishable and separate educational interest, nor one 
60. 398 F. Supp. at 786. 
61. 398. F. Supp. at 789. 
62." 398 F. Supp. at 791-93. 
63. 398 F. Supp. at 792; see Mica. COMP. LAws §§ 651-655 (1970). 
64. 398 F. Supp. at 792 n.8. 
65. 422 F. Supp. 988 (D.N.H. 1976). 
66. The court's lengthy findings of fact are set out at 422 F. Supp. at 991-96. 
67. 422 F. Supp. at 997. 
68. See authorities cited in note 40 supra. 
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that is not already served by the penal statutes of this state. The 
presence or absence of stealing on campus does not disrupt or 
disturb the operation of its academic functions. The only interest 
to which the Institute could point to justify the search was to 
shelter its students from the criminal law enforcement authorities. 
Commendable or not, this is not an interest which justifies an 
infringement upon constitutional liberties. 69 
But unlike the Smyth court, the Morale court did not hold 
that a dormitory search must be preceded by a showing of proba-
ble cause to be reasonable. Morale held that a search was also 
reasonable if it furthered a legitimate interest of the educational 
institution "separate and distinct from that served by New 
Hampshire's criminal law."70 The court suggested that adminis-
trative checks of rooms for health and safety hazards or entry 
during emergencies, such as fire, might satisfy this nebulous 
legitimate interest test.71 
Smyth and Morale illustrate a trend toward an expansion of 
students' fourth amendment protection from searches by state 
universities. While continuing to recognize colleges' inherent 
right to discipline students, 72 these decisions indicate that college 
69. 422 F. Supp. at 998. Hence, the Morale court, like the Smyth court, did not 
consider a college's disciplinary and law-enforcement interests cumulatively, a possibility 
suggested in text at note 20 supra. The failure of these courts to consider the strength of 
the college's interest in discipline or "an educational atmosphere" may be because colleges 
no longer enforce disciplinary regulations designed to create such an atmosphere. See, e.g., 
An End to Expulsions?, supra note 20, at 72. 
70. 422 F. Supp. at 998. 
71. 422 F. Supp. at 998. However, if the Morale court intended to say that adminis-
trative searches such as these were reasonable without a warrant, then .it must have 
overlooked Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), where the Supreme Court 
held that municipal health code inspections were subject to the fourth amendment's 
warrant requirement. 
Morale's reasoning on this point seems to suffer the same problem as Moore. See text 
at note 20 supra. For instance, a dormitory-room entry to investigate alleged plagiarism 
or to remove a stereo that was disturbing other student's studies could arguably be justi-
fied as supporting a legitimate interest of the educational institution. Yet, it is in such 
purely disciplinary or "educational" situations that the university's interest is the weak-
est, and thus the grant of an extraordinary power to search least appropriate. To the extent 
a university has an interest in its disciplinary regulations that is separate from society's 
interest in law enforcement, that interest, standing alone, must be considered to be weaker 
than the law-enforcement interest. 
72. In Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969), the court said, 
No one disputes the power of the University to protect itself by means of 
disciplinary action against disruptive students. Power to punish and the rules defin-
ing the exercise of that power are n9t, however, identical •... Government offi-
cers, including school administrators, must act in accord with rules in meting out 
discipline. 
418 F.2d at 167. Accord, Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 192 (1972); Esteban v. Central Mo. 
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officials, in carrying out that responsibility, may no longer resort 
to extraordinary measures not available to traditional law-
enforcement officers. But this increased recognition of students' 
rights of privacy has not yet been completely reflected in colleges' 
regulations governing searches by their officials. Several state 
universities have no regulations governing searches or permit 
searches of dormitory rooms with a showing of something less 
than probable cause.73 Unfortunately, the situation may persist 
long after Moore's interment simply because students rarely use 
counsel to present their grievances.74 While students probably do 
not need counsel at most school disciplinary proceedings, a mech-
anism should exist to vindicate student rights in those situations 
where overzealous college officials unreasonably invade the pri-
vacy of a student's dormitory room. The usual device for protect-
ing such fourth amendment interests has been the exclusionary 
rule. 
IL STUDENTS' FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS MERIT THE PROTEC-
TION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
It is one thing to say that a search of a college student's room 
is illegal; it is another to argue that evidence seized in such a 
< 
State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1089 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970). 
In Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the right of 
the states and the universities to discipline students. The Court held, though, that this 
disciplinary authority did not keep the first amendment from applying with anything less 
than its full force. 408 U.S. at 192-93. The Court ruled that a state university had denied 
recognition as a university organization to a local chapter of the S.D.S. on grounds incon-
sistent with the first amendment. 
73. Letters of inquiry concerning campus search and seizure regulations were sent to 
the largest state university in each state. Of the 27 institutions that responded: 
3 had no regulation governing searches; 
3 allowed searches at the discretion of university officials; 
1 required suspicion of.violation of a regulation; 
1 required that there be "reason to believe" there was a violation of law or 
regulation; 
1 required that there be a clear and present danger of crime - or simply that 
· a regulation was being violated; 
1 required a clear indication of a violation of a law or regulation; 
5 required authorization of search by a particular university official, and a 
showing of cause to that official. Of these 5, 2 required reasonable cause, and 3 
required probable cause; 
9 required probable cause, and that a warrant be obtained, except in exigent 
circumstances; 
3 did not allow any searches by university officials. 
(See letters on file with the Michigan Law Review.) 
74. See note 10 supra. 
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search should not be considered in a college disciplinary proceed-
ing. Several lower court decisions suggest that the exclusionary 
rule does not apply to college disciplinary proceedings. Moore, for 
example, implied that the rule was not applicable, 75 although its 
holding that the search was valid made any detailed inquiry into 
the problem unnecessary.76 Ekelund v. Secretary of Commerce,77 
a case that involved a search at the Merchant Marine Academy, 
and Morale v. Grigel18 also said that the exclusionary rule should 
not apply to disciplinary hearings. Only Smyth v. Lubbers has 
held that illegally seized evidence must be excluded from college 
disciplinary hearings. 79 
Yet careful analysis of the privacy interests violated by war-
rantless dormitory searches and of the exclusionary rule's objec-
tives reveals that Smyth was correct: the rule should apply. This 
Section reviews three independently convincing reasons to allow 
the exclusionary rule's protections to embrace the victim of a 
dormitory search. First, the reasons for which the Supreme Court 
has recently chosen not to apply the rule in other settings do not 
fit the college context. Second, the civil-criminal distinction pro-
pounded in Ekelund and Morale is an overly simplistic rule, only 
superficially supported by precedent. Finally, even if the civil-
75. The court stated: "It is clearly settled that due process in college disciplinary 
proceedings does not require full-blown adversary hearings subject to rules of evidence and 
all constitutional criminal guaranties." Moore v. Student Affairs Comm., 284 F. Supp. 
at 730. 
76. Most contemporary commentators disagreed with the Moore dicta concerning 
students' due process rights. As early as 1963, one commentator suggested that evidence 
seized in campus searches should be excluded by analogy to a criminal proceeding. Van 
Alstyne, Procedural Due Process and State University Students, 10 UCLA L. REV. 368, 
387 (1963). 
Another commentator noted that the distinqtion between civil and criminal proceed-
ings was a historical accident, and suggested that the exclusionary rule should apply to 
all proceedings. Comment, supra note 49, at 527-28. See also Comment, supra note 13, at 
155, arguing that the exclusionary rule was necessary to protect even the lesser fourth 
amendment rights that Moore gave to students. 
In Caldwell v. Cannady, 340 F. Supp. 835 (N.D. Tex. 1972), the court held that the 
exclusionary rule must be applied in a suspension hearing before a local school board. In 
that case, marijuana that was to be used as evidence in the hearing against two high-
school students had been seized by police officers who, in the court's judgment, clearly 
had time to obtain a warrant. 340 F. Supp. at 839. The court, relying on Tinker v. Des 
Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), justified its decision by the 
simple principle that students give up none of their constitutional rights by attending· 
school. 
77. 418 F. Supp. 102 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). 
78. 422 F. Supp. 988 (D.N.H. 1976). 
79. 398 F. Supp. at 794. 
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criminal distinction were useful, Supreme Court decisions reveal 
that college disciplinary proceedings impose sufficient quasi-
criminal deprivations to warrant application of the exclusionary 
rule. 
A. The Limits of the Burger Court's Limitations on the Exclu-
sionary Rule 
The Supreme Court under Chief Justice Burger has sought 
to limit the applicability of the exclusionary rule.80 In three deci-
sions, United States v. Calandra, 81 United States v. Janis, 82 and 
Stone v. Powell, 83 the Burger Court refused to apply the rule in 
noncriminal settings. Examination of these three decisions, how-
ever, indicates that their reasons for not applying the exclusion-
ary rule are not appropriate to cases such as Morale and Smyth. 
Historically, the Supreme Court has justified the use of the 
exclusionary rule on two grounds: (1) the preservation of judicial 
integrity84 - protecting the courts from becoming partners in 
80. But see Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the 
Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1320, 1402 (1977), challenging the widely held belief that 
the Burger Court has narrowed criminals' rights under the Constitution. 
81. 414 U.S. 338 (1974). Federal agents searched Calandra's place of business pur-
suant to a warrant. They discovered a card that may have been a loansharking record and 
also seized the company records. Later, a grand jury was convened to investigate viola• 
tions of federal loansharking laws. Pursuant to FEo. R. CmM. P. 41(e), Calandra moved 
for suppression and return of the evidence, claiming defects in the affidavits supporting 
the warrant. The district court entered an order for suppression and return of the evidence, 
and further held that Calandra did not need to answer grand jury questions, on the ground 
that they were based on evidence obtained from an unlawful search and seizure. 
82. 428 U.S. 433 (1976). Cash and wagering records were seized by Los Angeles police 
officers executing a warrant obtained from a state court. The warrant was then quashed, 
but the IRS later used the evidence in a tax assessment proceeding against Janis. The 
taxpayer sued for a ~efund and won when the evidence was suppressed. The Supreme 
Court reversed, holding that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule did not apply to 
evidence seized by state law enforcement officials when it was used in a civil proceeding 
brought for or against the federal government. 
83. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). Two prisoners had been convicted of murder in state courts, 
partly on the basis of evidence obtained in searches under a vagrancy statute that they 
alleged to be unconstitutional. Their convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Later 
they petitioned the federal courts for habeas corpus, raising their fourth amendment 
claims for the first time. The Supreme Court held that where the state had afforded the 
prisoner a full and fair opportunity for litigating his fourth amendment claim in a state 
. court, the federal court should not consider the claim in ruling on the petition for habeas 
corpus. 
84. "The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain 
conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions . • • . should find no 
sanction in the judgments of the courts, which are charged at all times with the support 
of the Constitution .... " Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1914). See also 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960). 
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illegal government conduct - and (2) the deterrence of illegal 
searches and seizures.ss Both seem to be sound expressions of, or 
perhaps surrogates for, the privacy interest that is protected at 
the cost of excluding relevant evidence. 'The Burger Court, how-
ever, has insisted that deterrence is the overriding justification for 
the rule.88 
To explain its recent constriction of the exclusionary rule's 
scope, the Court applied the familiar balancing test. In Calandra, 
which held that the foµrth amendment exclusionary rule would 
not be extended to grand jury hearings, the Court found the cost 
of applying the rule to be high and the deterrent effect low. 87 The 
costs of a grand jury exclusionary rule included the usual risks of 
obscuring the truth and freeing the guilty as well as an additional 
risk of unduly restricting the grand jury's _investigative efforts.88 
The Court found these costs to outweigh the marginal deterrence 
benefits, concluding that such a rule would deter only police con-
duct directed solely at obtaining an indictment from the grand 
jury. 89 Assuming that police are primarily concerned with convic-
tions and not indictments, any incentive that officers may have 
to violate fourth amendment rights had already been substan-
tially negated by the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence from 
trial. 90 The deterrent effect of keeping evidence from the grand 
jury was therefore negligible. 91 
The Court again used a balancing test in United States v. 
Janis, 92 but its inquiry was curiously concentrated on the deter-
rence side of the cost-benefit balance. 93 It virtually ignored the 
low cost of applying the rule.94 Since Janis asked only that evi-
dence be excluded from a civil tax proceeding to assess a wagering 
excise tax, the exclusion only would have lowered tax revenues; 
it would not have freed a guilty party.es Nevertheless, the Court 
I. 
85. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 u:s. 643, 656 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 
206, 217 (1960). 
86. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 486; United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. at 446; United 
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347. 
87. 414 U.S. at 351-52. See note 81 supra. 
88. 414 U.S. at 342-46. 
89. 414 U.S. at 351. 
90. 414 U.S. at 351. 
91. 414 U.S. at 351-52. 
92. 428 U.S. 433 (1976). 
93. 428 U.S. at 448-49. 
94. 428 U.S. at 437-38. See note 82 supra. 
95. The tax proceeding could not have established Janis's guilt anyway. Only his 
prosecution for local gambling law violations could have done so, and the seized evidence 
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decided that no matter how insignificant the social cost of apply-
ing the rule, it should not be applied where there is no appreciable 
deterrent benefit. The Court found that excluding the evidence 
in Janis would not appreciably deter illegal ·searches by state 
police officers, because the tax proceedings were outside their 
"zone of primary interest"96 - bringing criminal offenders to jus-
tice. 
In Stone v. Powell, 97 the Supreme Court considered the wis-
dom of applying the exclusionary rule to habeas corpus review of 
a state-court criminal proceeding. It first enumerated the costs of 
applying the exclusionary rule: obstructing the truth-finding pro-
cess and occasionally freeing someone guilty of a serious crime 
because of a minor error by a police officer. 98 On the deterrence 
side of the balance, the Court found that state law-enforcement 
officials are generally unconcerned with the outcome of federal 
habeas corpus proceedings, which often occur years after the state 
trial. 99 It decided that since such proceedings are outside their 
zone of primary interest, the deterrent effect of the exclusionary 
rule would be insignificant. 
In each of these three Supreme Court decisions, the balance 
of interests tipped against the exclusionary rule. But the balanc-
ing process does not inevitably work against the exclusionary 
rule; all three decisions acknowledged that the balance favors the 
rule in a criminal trial.100 Moreover, the Court has stopped short 
had already been properly excluded from the criminal proceeding. 428 U.S. at 438. 
96. 428 U.S. 458. The court believed that the "intersovereign" nature of the search 
militated against any deterrent effect. In making this point, the Court assumed that the 
state officers did not customarily help federal officers enforce wagering laws, and since 
they had no responsibility to the federal officials, the state officers could not possibly be 
deterred by excluding the evidence from the federal tax proceeding. 428 U.S. at 455 n.31. 
The court conceded that_-this assumption was rebuttable if Janis could show federal 
participation in the investigative action or an agreement between state and federal offi-
cials to exchange evidence. Rebutting this assumption is obviously a difficult burden for 
the victim of the search, as the relevant information is in the hands and minds of the law-
enforcement officials. Justice Stewart, in his dissent, severely attacked the assumption, 
finding a pattern of "mutual cooperation and coordination, with the federal wagering tax 
provisions buttressing state and federal criminal sanctions." 421 U.S. at 461-62. 
97. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
98. 428 U.S. at 490-91. 
99. 428 U.S. at 493. The Court also pointed out that there was little need for consider-
ation of the exclusionary-rule claims when, due to Mapp u. Ohio, prisoners already had a 
full opportunity to litigate those claims in state court when they were originally tried for 
their offenses. 428 U.S. at 492-95. The Court's argument assumed that state courts would 
be as sympathetic and competent in considering fourth amendment claims as were federal 
courts. 492 U.S. at 493 n.35. 
100. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 492-93; United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. at 458-69; 
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of denying that the rule would ever apply in noncriminal set-
tings.101 It has been quite willing to balance the interests case by 
case, looking closely at the deterrent effect and the cost of that 
deterrence. Analysis of college disciplinary h~arings must there-
fore evaluate them by the balancing test of Calandra, Janis, and 
Stone. But of the three cases102 that have considered the issue 
since Calandra, only Smyth v. Lubbers actually jiggled the 
scales.1°3 
Finding that the exclusionary rule applied to college discipli-
nary proceedings, the Smyth court carefully studied the rule's 
deterrent effect. In the college setting, the rule may well be the 
only effective deterrent, since students ordinarily do not have the 
means to bring a damage suit, and the good-faith defense makes 
recovery of damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unlikely.1°4 Even the 
Morale court acknowledged that not applying the rule would 
leave the aggrieved student almost without a remedy.1°5 More-
over, the rule is an effective check against overzealous local 
police officers, who often have a substantial interest in the dis-
ciplinary proceeding's outcome. College officials and local police 
often pursue a program of cooperative enforcement of laws and 
regulations. 106 If evidence seized illegally by local police officers 
were not excluded from a college proceeding that has authority 
to expel the student, 107 those officers could use such hearings to · 
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348. 
101. Instead the court has applied the intrasovereign-intersovereign distinction in 
noncriminal cases. See text at note 96 supra. 
102. Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777 (W.D. Mich. 1975); Morale v. Grigel, 422 
F. Supp. 988 (D.N.H. 1976); Ekelund v. Secretary of Commerce, 418 F. Supp. 102 
(E.D.N.Y. 1976). 
103. 398 F. Supp. at 794. 
104. 398 F. Supp. at 794. For an early assessment of alternative remedies, see Wolf 
v. Colorado, 388 U.S. 25, 41-43 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting). For an assessment of the 
availability of a remedy under the civil rights law, see Developments in the Law, Section 
1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1133 (1977). 
The qualified good faith immunity available to school officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
(1976) often prevents recovery. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 313-22 (1975). The 
damage action against federal officials, established by Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), has also been limited by 
a good faith caveat. See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau 
of Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972). 
105. 422 F. Supp. at 1001. 
106. Moore, Morale, Smyth, and Ekelund are all examples of this cooperative en-
forcement. See Note, Admissibility of Evidence Seized by Private University Officials in 
Violation of Fourth Amendment Standards, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 507, 513-15 (1971), detail-
ing the cooperation between police and college officials at Cornell University. 
107. Of course, there will be instances when the exclusionary rule will not be an 
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accomplish law-enforcement objectives with evidence not ad-
missible in local criminal hearings.108 And the recurrent pattern 
of cooperation between college officials and local law enforcers 
documents the prevalence of this variation of the "silver platter" 
doctrine109 whenever the rule is not applied. 
The social costs of applying the exclusionary rule to college 
disciplinary hearings are inadequate to tip the balance. College 
tribunals often examine minor criminal violations, but they 
rarely investigate severe offenses. While the cost to society of 
allowing a student who has violated a school regulation to remain 
enrolled is not insignificant, it is dwarfed by the heavy price that 
the exclusionary rule is usually thought to exact: freeing those 
guilty of violent, despicable crimes. 
Overall, application of the exclusionary rule to college disci-
plinary proceedings fares well under the Burger Court's balancing 
test. 110 In many dormitory-search situations, the costs of the rule 
would be outweighed by the benefits, even if one restricts the 
judicially recognizable benefits to deterrence, as the Burger Court 
would. While the balance may not tip toward the exclusionary 
rule in every college disciplinary proceeding, Morale's broad hold-
ing that the rule should never apply is unjustified. 
effective deterrent. For instance, if university officials decide, on their own initiative, to 
use evidence seized by law enforcement officers with whom they have no cooperative 
arrangement, then the application will not be effective to deter the police officers, since 
the proceeding is outside their zone of primary interest. The exclusionary rule should not 
be applied in such situations, even though Janis would presume the deterrence effective 
since the seizing authority and the authority using the evidence are both agencies of the 
state government. 
108. "[T]he college proceedings certainly performed all the functions of a criminal 
action." 398 F. Supp. at 787. 
109. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). The exclusionary rule will also 
be an effective deterrent for the college employees involved in a search. When a criminal 
goes free because of the exclusionary rule, he often disappears into a large community, 
and has no further contact with the police officer who improperly seized the evidence. 
Colleges and universities, however, are more intimate communities, and those who 
improperly searched a student's room, such as resident advisors and head residents, may 
even live on the same hall as the accused student. If the college is unable to discipline 
the student because the evidence was illegally seized, these employees will have to suffer 
the continued presence of the undisciplined student near their living quarters. In addition, 
since college disciplinary proceedings are well within the "zone of primary interest" of a 
college official, exclusion of illegally seized evidence, under the Janis rationale, would 
serve as an effective deterrent. See note 96 supra and accompanying text. 
110. Some commentators have argued that the balancing test - and especially the 
confusing way in which it was applied in Janis - is a step on the road towards overruling 
the exclusionary rule. Note, Constitutional Criminal Procedure -Applicability of Exclu-
sionary Rule to Intrasouereign Civil Suits, 51 TuL. L. REv. 717 (1977); Note, 8 'Tux. TEcu. 
L. REV. 689, 698 (1977). But see Israel, supra note 80, at 1408. 
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B. The Frailty of the Civil-Criminal Distinction 
Language in the Morale 111 and Ekelund 112 opinions indicates 
that those courts read the Supreme Court's decisions in 
Calandra, Janis, and Stone as establishing a civil-criminal dis-
tinction for applying the exclusionary rule; the two district courts 
deduced that the rule does not apply in civil cases. 113 A close 
reading of Janis, however, discloses that the Court carefully 
avoided drawing a simple civil-criminal distinction, 114 and for 
good reasons. 115 The distinction draws no nourishment from the 
111. 422 F. Supp. at 1000-01. 
112. 418 F. Supp. at 106. 
113. Two respected fourth amendment scholars have stated that the amendment's 
protection has been inapplicable to civil proceedings since Murray v. Hoboken Land & 
Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855). J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND 
THE SUPREME COURT 52 n.13. (1966); N. LAssoN, THE HisTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 90 (1937). Murray involved an 
action for ejectment. The main issue in the case was whether a particular "distress war-
rant" (a summary means of executing a levy on a debtor's land) conformed to due process. 
To read Murray as limiting the fourth amendment protection to criminals is to read 
it too narrowly. Although there is some language in the decision to the effect that the 
fourth amendment does not specifically affect civil debt proceedings, the Court decided 
only that the term "warrant" in the fourth amendment did not include a "distress war-
rant" and thus no oath or affirmation was required: "[T]his article [fourth amendmentJ 
has no reference to civil proceedings for the recovecy of debts, of which a search warrant 
is not made a part." 59 U.S. at 285-86. Lasson cites three other cases as establishing the 
civil-criminal distinction in fourth-amendment jurisprudence: Blackmer v. United States, 
284 U.S. 421 (1932); American TobaCC!) v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284 (1907); and Fong 
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). These cases in fact gave little considera-
tion to the issue, and their holdings did not establish such a broad principle. 
Fong Yue Ting upheld the constitutionality of an act providing for the deportation 
of Chinese laborers. Dicta in the decision hinted that the fourth amendment would not 
be applied to such deportation proceedings, but that conclusion was based on the fact that 
the deported person was not deprived of any constitutional interest because of his alien 
status, rather than on the fact that deportation was not a criminal proceeding. 149 U.S. 
at 730. 
In American Tobacco, the defendant objected to a writ of replevin on fourth amend-
ment grounds. The court rejected the fourth amendment claim summarily, without any 
discussion of a distinction between civil and criminal proceedings. 
In Blackmer, the Court held only that a levy on property to satisfy the owner's 
liability was not a search or seizure within the constitutional prohibition. The court did 
not reach the question of a civil-criminal distinction. 
114. 428 U.S. at 455-56 n.31. "Respondent remains free on remand to attempt to 
prove that there was federal participation in fact. If he succeeds in that proof, he raises 
the question, not presented by this case, whether the exclusionary rule is to be applied in 
a civil proceeding involving an intra-sovereign violation." 
115. This Note is by no means the first legal commentary attacking the civil-criminal 
distinction. See, e.g., LaFave, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The 
Camara and See Cases, 1967 SuP. CT. R.Ev. 1; Note, Rationalizing Administrative 
Searches, 77 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1291 (1979); Note, Administrative Search Warrants, 58 MINN. 
L. R.Ev. 607 (1974). 
1562 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 77:1540 
history of the fourth,amendment which is rooted in the colonists' 
grievances against the King's writs of assistance. 116 The King un-
leashed these writs upon the colonists primarily to enforce cus-
toms and revenue laws, not to facilitate criminal investigations. 117 
Thus, the amendment's purpose was to restrain all invasions of 
privacy incident to government investigations, whether civil or 
criminal. Notably, the fourth amendment, unlike the other Bill 
of Rights provisions from which defendants' rights arise, 11K con-
tains no reference to crimes at all; surely the Framers foresaw no 
civil-criminal distinction in its application. 
Logic as well as history may explain the Court's hesitancy to 
establish a civil-criminal distinction119 in applying the exclusion-
ary rule. Pursued to its extreme, such a distinction suggests that 
government should be deterred at great social cost from invading 
the privacy of rapists, murderers, and kidnappers, but not from 
invading the privacy of students with loud stereos, homeowners 
with dirty basements, or taxpayers suing for refunds. If anything, 
common sense would seem to dictate the opposite standard: few 
exclusions in criminal proceedings, many in civil contexts where 
fourth amendment rights can be protected at less cost to so-
ciety .120 
C. The Quasi-Criminal Character of College 
Disciplinary Hearings 
Even if fourth amendment jurisprudence could properly be 
116. 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976). 
117. See J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 113; N. LAssoN, supra note 113, at 51-78. 
118. The fifth, sixth, and eighth amendments all appear on their face to deal with 
procedural protections for those accused (and, under the eighth amendment, convicted) 
of criminal offenses. 
119. The civil-criminal distinction applies to the nature of the proceedings in which 
a fourth amendment issue is raised, and not to the function of the person making the 
search or seizure. Evidence illegally seized by private persons has always been admissible, 
as the fourth amendment applies only to federal and, through the fourteenth amendment, 
to state action. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921); Sackler v. Sackler, 16 
N.Y.2d 40, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83, 203 N.E.2d 481 (1964). 
120. Of course, supporters of the view might reply that we are interested not only in 
the invasion itself, but also in the consequences of that invasion. They might then soy 
that the invasion of the murderer's privacy is more egregious because he - and not the 
noisy student - will be hanged because of the invasion. However plausible this analysis 
may be, the Supreme Court implicitly rejected it when it chose to look only to the exclu-
sionary rule's deterrent value, and not to the possible loss of judicial dignity in acting on 
ill-gotten gains. See text at notes 84-86 supra. Privacy is privacy, no matter whose privacy 
is at stake. 
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interpreted to embrace a civil-criminal distinction, 121 that dis-
tinction would be a fluid one, incapable of rigid, formalistic appli-
cation. Courts have regularly applied the exclusionary rule to 
proceedings that, though civil in form, were criminal in sub-
stance.122 Extension of such analysis to college disciplinary pro-
ceedings, which may often impose severe, quasi-criminal sanc-
tions, requires that they, too, apply the protective restraints of 
the exclusionary rule. 
The Supreme Court's most noteworthy recapitulation of the 
need to look beyond formal classifications was One 1958 Plym-
outh Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 123 where the Court employed the 
exclusionary rule in an automobile forfeiture proceeding, due to 
the proceeding's quasi-criminal character. 124 The Court compared 
the potential criminal and civil penalties faced by the violator. 
Observing that the defendant would only suffer a maximum pen-
alty of $500 for possessing or transporting untaxed liquor under 
the criminal law, the Court concluded that the civil penalty of 
forfeiture of his car, valued at $1000, was a more severe punish-
ment.125 The Court then noted that, for purposes of applying the 
exclusionary rule, whether an ostensibly civil proceeding is quasi-
criminal hinges upon two inquiries: (1) whether its object is to 
penalize the commission of an offense against the criminal law, 126 
121. The Supreme Court once flirted with this view, see Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 
360 (1959), but has since retreated, see Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); 
See v. City of Seattle 387 U.S. 541 (1967). However, the more lenient standard of probable 
cause for administrative searches enunciated in Camara and See suggests that the distinc-
tion still lingers, at least in a diluted form. 
122. In the years before the Warren Court spoke to the issue, the rule was used in a 
variety of settings in lower federal courts: United States v. Five Thousand Six Hundred 
Eight Dollars & Thirty Cents, 326 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1964) (forfeiture proceedings); Rogers 
v. United States, 97 F.2d 691 (1st Cir. 1938) (proceeding to enjoin the collection of federal 
wagering taxes); Lassoff v. Gray, 207 F. Supp. 843 (W.D. Ky. 1962) (equitable action to 
revoke a state gambling license); Ex parte Jackson, 263 F. ifo (D. Mont. 1920), appeal 
dismissed, Andrews v. Jackson, 267 F. 1022 (9th Cir. 1920) (deportation hearing); United 
States v. Wong Quong Wong, 94 F. 832 (D. Vt. 1899) (action to recover customs duties on 
imported liquor); Carlisle v. State, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So. 2d 596 (1964) (wrongful death 
action); Lebel v. Swincicki, 354 Mich. 427, 93 N.W.2d 281 (1958) (negligent driving ac-
tion). See Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 670, 678-83 (1966). 
123. 380 U.S. 693 (1965). In Plymouth Sedan, state liquor enforcement officers 
searched an automobile without probable cause or warrant and found 31 cases of liquor 
lacking Pennsylvania tax seals. The state filed an action for forfeiture of the automobile 
and offered the liquor as evidence. 380 U.S. at 694-95. 
124. The Court had applied the rule to forfeiture proceedings in the progenitor of all 
fourth amendment jurisprudence, Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
125. 380 U.S. at 700-01. 
126. 380 U.S. at 700. 
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and· (2) whether the penalty levied is as severe as that for the 
associated- criminal offense.127 
These inquiries suggest that the exclusionary rule would 
often be appropriate in college disciplinary proceedings. First, 
students are typically disciplined for offenses such as theft, as-
sault, vandalism, and possession of illicit substances. 128 While 
most of these violations are relatively minor, they are every bit 
as criminal as the violation in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan. Second, 
colleges frequently impose rather severe financial penalties on 
offending students; suspension, for example, often involves forfei-
ture of any tuition already paid and of the student's dormitory 
leasehold interest. Suspension may also cripple a student's abil-
ity to continue his education or to obtain a job. 120 Thus, like 
criminal proceedings, college disciplinary proceedings can seri-
ously damage a person's reputation and livelihood. 130 
127. 380 U.S. at 700-01. The Court also noted that where the goods to be forfeited 
are intrinsically illegal, such as smuggled narcotics, the defendant cannot use the fourth 
amendment to regain them in a forfeiture proceeding. 380 U.S. at 698-99. This principle 
is not discussed in the ensuing material, as it is largely hypothetical; few students will 
attempt to use the fourth amendment to get their marijuana back. Those who do try are 
unlikely to succeed. 
128. This was true in the principal cases discussed in this Note, all of which included 
charges of marijuana possession. Morale v. Grigel, 422 F. Supp. 988, 991 (D.N.H. 1976); 
Smyth v. Lubbers, 298 F. Supp. 777, 798 (W.D. Mich. 1975); Moore v. Student Affairs 
Comm., 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968). 
129. See Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. at 797. Not all schools impose as heavy 
penalties as did Grand Valley, however. See note 35 supra for the practice of the Univer-
sity of Michigan. Compare the practice at the University of Texas at Austin, where a wide 
variety of penalties are authorized for violation of a regents' rule, university regulation, 
~r administrative rule: 
(1) admonition; 
(2) warning probation; 
(3) disciplinary probation; 
(4) withholding,of official transcript or degree; 
(5) expulsion and a bar from readmission; 
(6) restitution; 
(7) suspension of rights and privileges; 
(8) suspension of eligibility for official athletic and nonathletic extracurricu-
lar activities; 
(9) failing grade; 
(10) denial of degree; 
(11) suspension from the university; 
(12) expulsion from the university; 
Sec. 11-501, The University of Texas at Austin, General Information, 1977-1978, app. C.:, 
Institutional Rules on Student Services and Activities (on file with the Michigan Law 
Review.) 
130. Of course, this same line of argument suggests the exclusionary rule should not 
apply in proceedings involving only violations of simple academic regulations or in 
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Interestingly, the balancing test of Calandra, Janis, and 
Stone 131 and the quasi-criminal test of One 1958 Plymouth Sedan 
may sometimes disagree over the applicability of the exclusionary 
rule. For instance, if a college disciplined a tenant for damage to 
a fixture in his room, the proceeding would probably not be classi-
fied as quasi-criminal.132 A court using the balancing test, how-
ever, might decide that the exclusionary rule would be appropri-
ate in a damage assessment proceeding: the rule would effectively 
deter college officials from seizing damaged fixtures by thwarting 
any efforts either to punish the student or to recover damages. 
Yet the social cost of applying the ~ule, due to the minor nature 
of the offense, is relatively low. 
The fact that the Court did not use the Plymouth Sedan 
theory in Janis, 133 arguably a quasi-criminal case, indicates that 
the Court may now prefer the balancing test over the quasi-
criminal inquiry. This preference is a desirable one, for the 
Calandra-Janis-Stone analysis, which balances the costs of 
applying the rule against its deterrent value, seems a more robust 
analytical tool. Although the quasi-criminal cases are useful pre-
cedent for the application of the exclusionary rule to many college 
cases, future cases may more profitably be analyzed under the 
balancing rationale of Calandra, Janis, and Stone. 
ill. CONCLUSION 
This Note has contended that a state university, like other 
governmental agencies, should comply with the fourth amend-
ment's warrant and probable cause requirements. Moreover, 
when a college seeks to discipline a student for nonacademic mis-
conduct, it should not consider evidence obtained by violating the 
fourth amendment.134 Unfortunately, the rules and regulations of 
several state colleges do not yet reflect fourth amendment imper-
atives.135 In drafting regulations that conform to these impera-
damage-assessment proceedings. In these situations, the proceeding does not concern 
criminal activity, and sanctions are relatively minor - usually a lower grade or a damage 
assessment. 
131. See Section III.A. supra. 
132. See note 130 supra. 
133. 428 U.S. ·433 (1976). The court did cite One 1958 Plymouth Sedan in developing 
the history of the exclusionary rule. 428 U.S. at 477 n.17. Justice Stewart, however, 
advanced the quasi-criminal argument in his dissent. 428 U.S. at 463. 
134. Of the 27 state universities answering inquiries, however, only nine applied some 
form of the exlusionary rule. -
135. See note 73 supra and accompanying text. 
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tives, college officials must keep in mind the unique features of 
campus life. Since law enforcement is not the primary duty of 
dormitory staff, since disciplinary hearing officers are not nor-
mally lawyers, and since students do not usually have access to 
lawyers who could apprise them of their fourth amendment 
rights, colleges should simplify their search and seizure regula-
tions to make them comprehensible to those without legal back-
grounds. The regulation should clearly articulate the student's 
fourth amendment rights and set forth remedies to enforce them. 
A regulation meeting those needs might take this form: 
§ 1. No employees of [the university] may enter an occupied 
dormitory room unless: 
a) the employee possesses a valid search warrant, 
b) one of the students living in the room expressly con-
sents to the entry, or 
c) there is a fire or other emergency creating imminent 
danger to life or property. 
§ 2. Evidence obtained by an entry not authorized by § 1 may 
not be considered in a disciplinary decision. 
The regulation applies to entries as well as searches, recog-
nizing that students have a privacy interest in their entire room 
and not just in their closets and drawers. For simplicity's sake, 
the regulation substitutes the word "emergency" for the legal 
term of art "exigent circumstances," a phrase that is ambiguous 
to most students and college officials (and, for that matter, to 
lawyers and judges). Furthermore, section 2 of the regulation asks 
the college disciplinary authority only to determine if the entry 
violated section 1 and thus obviates any need to step into the 
quagmire of constitutional balancing.136 The proposed regulation 
envisions that maintenance, housekeeping, health, and safety 
inspections by university officials, since they are as much for the 
student's benefit as the school's, can be accommodated by the 
consent provision. If not, then the university may inspect the 
rooms between terms, when the room is vacant and the new stu-
dent has not yet moved in. 
136. The proposed regulation is largely preventive; it is designed to safeguard fourth 
amendment rights in a proceeding that involves no attorneys and is not likely to be 
appealed to a traditional court of law. As a result, application of its "lay" language may 
not always coincide perfectly with the rigors of the fourth amendment. However, the 
regulation at least forces colleges to proceed in a more careful manner before invading the 
privacy of a student's room. In a search situation where formal vindication of fourth 
amendment rights is not likely, that may be the only feasible protection for the privacy 
interests that the amendment was designed to secure. 
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Of course, colleges might adopt any of a multitude of varia-
tions upon this regulation, and students still have the option of 
vindicating their privacy interests through formal action in fed-
eral courts. The proposed regulation, however, will eliminate the 
need for frequent and costly judicial intervention in dormitory 
affairs, and ensure respect for the "new" fourth amendment 
rights that students enjoy under Smyth and Morale. 
0 
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